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The supply chains of the mobile phone industry span national and ﬁrm boundaries. To
analyze how value is distributed among the participants, a framework based on theories
of ﬁrm strategy is applied, and a novel methodology is used to measure value capture in
three phone models introduced from 2004 to 2008. The research shows that carriers
capture the greatest value (in terms of gross proﬁt) from each handset, followed closely
by handset makers, with suppliers a distant third. However, the situation is reversed in
terms of operating proﬁt. Carriers shoulder the burden of network installation,
maintenance, and upgrading, which absorbs much of the value from their subscription
fees. Handset maker nationality, which may also inﬂuence supplier choice, is a key
determinant of the geographic distribution of value capture. The results are also used to
estimate the relationship of handset subsidies to carrier proﬁts, which has been an issue
of concern for antitrust authorities in several countries. The analysis shows how the
framework can be used to calculate how much service charges might be inﬂated to
cover the subsidies.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Over the past decade, ﬁrms working around the world on the convergence of computing, communications and
consumer electronics have created products with a high capability to price ratio that is driving large-scale adoption,
particularly in the developed economies. One of the most visible manifestations is the multi-function smartphone,
a mobile phone that can perform computing functions such as accessing the Internet and storing data as well as consumer
applications such as playing music and video. Nokia’s N-Series, Research in Motion’s (RIM) BlackBerry product line, Apple’s
iPhone, and a variety of products based on Google’s Android operating system are the top-selling smartphones worldwide
as of early 2011.
Smartphone makers have created tremendous value through product engineering, design, and system integration, as
have the producers of innovative components on which they rely. Value also comes from the sophisticated telecommu-
nications systems via which they communicate and from a distributed global network of software and service providers
that may include dozens of countries and hundreds of ﬁrms (Li & Whalley, 2002).
In order to beneﬁt from innovation within this network, ﬁrms (and, in some sense, nations) must not only create but
also capture value. Within the complex global value chain (Gerefﬁ, Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005) that supports the cellll rights reserved.
x: þ1 949 824 8091.
kraemer@uci.edu (K.L. Kraemer), glinden@berkeley.edu (G. Linden).
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ability to proﬁt from innovation is a function of ﬁrm strategies and industry structure (Dedrick, Kraemer, & Linden, 2010;
Porter, 1980; Teece, 1986).
It is an empirical question who proﬁts most when innovation, production, and distribution activities span national and
ﬁrm boundaries. The answer is not readily discernable when the key prices are negotiated rather than reached in an open
market environment. The answer is especially difﬁcult to observe when prices are obscured by various subsidies or by
bundling of products and services by mobile carriers, as is often the case in the US market.
From a public policy perspective, the embeddedness of the smartphone in a global value network raises the question of
how countries can capture the greatest economic and social beneﬁts from innovation. When domestic handset producers
rely on foreign suppliers of components and manufacturing services, will policies to support domestic producers create
value for the home country or send it elsewhere? Previous research suggests that the home country of a major brand-name
ﬁrm in a global value chain receives value that is diffused in the form of high wage jobs (e.g., R&D, management, and
marketing), and returns to shareholders (Linden, Dedrick, & Kraemer, 2009). However, job creation in terms of headcount
may be skewed towards low-wage countries where labor-intensive assembly is located (Linden, Dedrick, & Kraemer,
in press). The following analysis focuses on ﬁnancial value, but any policy discussion needs to keep the issue of
manufacturing jobs in mind as well.
Another important public policy issue concerns the competitive rules for carriers. How do the existing rules of
competition affect carrier proﬁts, subscriber fees, and the rate of technology uptake by consumers? The relatively slow
adoption of mobile communication technologies in the US compared to European and Asian economies has been blamed
on the institutional structure of the US mobile sector, with strong carriers effectively limiting the innovation of
manufacturers and fragmentation of standards slowing diffusion (Funk, 2006; Wu, 2007). However, later adoption can
bring advantages (such as a lower equipment cost, learning from the experiences of other countries, and not being saddled
with obsolete technologies and standards) that may exceed the potential competitive beneﬁts of early adoption.
The aspect of carrier competition of concern here is the use of carrier subsidies for phones in exchange for ﬁxed-term
contracts with subscribers. Roughly half the smartphones sold worldwide are subsidized by the carrier in countries
including the US, Japan, and France (Ahonen, 2010, p. 116). The social welfare costs and beneﬁts of these subsidies have
been debated in the academic literature, and they have been the object of bans in various countries, including South Korea
and Finland (Albon & York, 2008; Kim, Byun, & Park, 2004; Tallberg, Hammainen, Toyli, Kamppari, & Kivi, 2007). United
States policymakers have also taken an interest. Congress and the Federal Communications Commission reportedly have
investigated exclusive deals made between wireless carriers and handset makers as possibly stiﬂing consumer choice and
raising prices (Puzzanghera, 2009; Reardon, 2009).
One thing lacking in most discussions about these issues is solid data on who is capturing value in the current industry
structure. Such data is needed to undertake an informed analysis of ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate, the market power of
different ﬁrms in the supply chain, and the distribution of value among the nations involved.
This article analyzes the supply chains of three high-end mobile phone models, including two smartphones, that each
beneﬁtted from carrier subsidies. These phones are representative of the high-end phones that are offered by carriers in
exclusive, heavily subsidized arrangements with handset makers.
The analysis applies a framework based on ﬁnancial measures of value capture, including various measures of
proﬁtability.3 This analysis answers the following questions: (1) How are the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of innovation distributed
among ﬁrms in a global value chain for advanced mobile technologies? (2) How much value is created and captured in the
home countries of innovative brand-name ﬁrms and component suppliers, versus countries where the products are
manufactured, or where they are distributed and used? (3) How do handset subsidies affect the proﬁtability of carriers and
handset makers, and the consumer cost of services?
Looking at individual handset models, the analysis shows that the carriers capture the greatest share of gross proﬁts
from each phone, followed closely by the handset makers who in turn capture far greater value than any of their
component suppliers. However, the handset makers are able to retain more of that proﬁt than the carriers, who must
invest heavily to maintain and upgrade their costly infrastructure. In terms of national outcomes, the analysis shows that
handset maker nationality matters most because these ﬁrms still retain a signiﬁcant share of the proﬁts from each unit
sold. This study does not analyze the distribution of jobs and wages, but a study of Apple’s iPod supply chain found that the
majority of jobs are in China and other low-wage countries, but the majority of wages are paid in the home country of the
brand-name ﬁrm (in that case, the US) (Linden et al., in press).
The next section provides a brief historical and conceptual discussion of competition in the mobile phone supply chain,
followed by an introduction to the analytical approach to be used. This is followed by a functional analysis of the
components within the phones in the study, and a detailed estimate of the proﬁts accruing to ﬁrms along the supply chain
of each phone. The results are then used in an analysis of the relation of handset subsidies to service charges and for
comparisons of a wider set of proﬁt measures among selected ﬁrms in the industry’s value network. The ﬁnal section
discusses the results and considers their policy implications.3 The concept of ‘‘value’’ could be deﬁned in various ways, including the number of jobs or the wages generated by an activity as well as the ﬁnancial
measures (gross proﬁt and value capture used here).
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Mobile telephony technology has shifted through recent decades from a plethora of nation-based technologies
commercialized by vertically integrated ﬁrms to a few global standards supported by globe-spanning supply chains.
Beginning in the 1950s, bulky portable phones with limited capabilities became available for a select user base. These have
given way to slim handsets at prices that have spurred mass acceptance. In 2010, telecom equipment maker Ericsson
estimated that over ﬁve billion mobile phones were in use, up from just 720 million a decade before (Ericsson, 2010).
While handset hardware has been integrating more functions over the past twenty years, industry supply chains in
telecommunications, as in the broader electronics industry, have been steadily disintegrating/disaggregating across
corporate and national boundaries (Dedrick & Kraemer, 1998; Sturgeon, 2002). Where once large integrated companies
such as AT&T built their own infrastructure, made the key components, and designed, manufactured and distributed their
own products, today these activities are more often carried out by independent companies in a vast global network
spanning the semiconductor, computer, communications and consumer electronics markets.
The deconstruction of the telecommunications industry and its increasing recombination with related sectors is described
by Li andWhalley (2002, p. 451) as a radical transformation where ‘‘value chains are rapidly evolving into value networks, with
multiple entry and exit points, creating enormous complexity for all the players involved.’’ They identify the distribution of
value capture among the various parties that contribute to a product or service as an important issue for determining the
viability and success of new enterprises, and they call for empirical research and new tools for understanding this question.
As a ﬁrst step toward understanding the distribution of value in these complex networks, this study uses the supply
chain, the series of organizations and processes through which a product passes from raw materials to the consumer’s
hands, as the unit of analysis. A cell phone, despite its small size, contains hundreds of parts. Most are low-value parts that
account for a small share of the value. A few high-value components, such as the display and the main microchips, account
for most of the cost. A brand-name (lead) handset maker, who may not even assemble the product in-house, contributes
its market knowledge, intellectual property, product design, system integration and cost management skills, and a brand
whose value reﬂects its reputation for quality, innovation, and customer service.
Mobile operators are the ﬁnal links in the chain to the consumer, and their role is key because they control the
customer relationship. In the US and many other countries, carriers subsidize the cost of many of the best-selling high-end
handsets in exchange for a period of exclusivity from the manufacturer, with some models of RIM’s BlackBerry phones
being notable exceptions. The carriers make up for the cost of the subsidies by requiring customers to commit to service
contracts of one to two years. As further protection for the carrier, the bundled phones are generally locked to work only
on a single carrier’s network, and the contracts include an Early Termination Fee. There are a variety of wholesale and
retail channels in the mobile phone market, particularly in Europe and Asia where unlocked phones are sold by retailers
without service contracts. For the purposes of this study of high-end phones, the focus is primarily on the US case to
illuminate the somewhat hidden economics of subsidized handsets.
To frame the analysis of the distribution of value among ﬁrms in the mobile phone supply chain, the study draws on
two theories from business strategy: proﬁting from innovation (PFI) and industrial organization (IO). This is consistent
with the approach taken to analyze value capture in other electronics markets (Dedrick et al., 2010). The PFI framework
(Teece, 1986) posits that a ﬁrm’s ability to proﬁt from innovation is based on, among other factors, industry maturity
(whether a dominant design has emerged), appropriability (the ability to capture proﬁts from innovation through means
such as patents, customer lock-in, or standards control), and complementarity (the ownership or control of assets
co-specialized with the focal product). This framework helps explain the relative proﬁtability of competing smartphone
makers such as Motorola, Nokia, Apple and RIM which have had varying success not only in creating products that
consumers want, but also in shaping a complete ecosystem around their handset platforms.
The IO framework explains the division of value among buyers and sellers in the supply chain based on the relative
bargaining power of participants (Porter, 1980). Bargaining power depends on industry concentration at a particular level
in the supply chain. Buyers (or sellers) have more bargaining power when there are only a few buyers (or sellers) in the
market. This framework helps explain the relative proﬁtability of phone makers vis-a-vis component suppliers or mobile
carriers.
3. Data sources and analytical approach
The supply chain analysis method used in this article has previously been applied in studies of notebook computers and
the iPod (Dedrick et al., 2010; Linden et al., 2009) where it is explained in detail. Its application here to high-end cellular
handsets is important for what it reveals about the relation between phone makers and carriers, who play a more active
role in sales and in the creation of a customer experience than do the retailers in the PC and iPod supply chains. The article
therefore analyzes the value captured by carriers as well as handset ﬁrms; however, it only analyzes the supply chain for
the phones and not for the carrier networks.
The analysis here is based on product-level data, which are extremely hard to obtain directly from electronics industry
ﬁrms, who jealously guard information about the pricing deals they have negotiated and often compel the silence of their
suppliers and contractors through non-disclosure agreements. However, for some electronic products, lists of components
and their estimated factory prices are available from industry analysts. These teardown reports are often cited in the press,
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an estimate of the handset maker’s product-level gross proﬁt, or, when expressed in percentage terms, gross margin.
Gross proﬁt is just one measure of ﬁnancial value captured by a ﬁrm. It is related to the more-familiar concept of net
proﬁt as follows:Wholesale price
Cost of goods (purchased inputs and direct labor)
¼Gross proﬁt
Overhead costs (R&D, depreciation, marketing, and administrative expenses)
¼Operating proﬁt
 Interest expenses, taxes, and one-time adjustments
¼Net proﬁt4 T
stated t
and the
The pre
(i.e., th
5 AGross proﬁt shows what share of a ﬁrm’s sales price is retained after the direct costs of producing a product are deducted.
Those funds can then be used to invest in future growth (R&D), cover the cost of capital depreciation, pay overhead
expenses (marketing and administration), and reward shareholders (dividends). It is an appropriate concept for the
product-speciﬁc level of analysis used in most of this article because it abstracts from the company’s administrative
efﬁciency (reﬂected in operating proﬁt) and from non-production factors such as the ﬁrm’s leverage and its investments in
other ﬁrms (reﬂected in net proﬁt). Operating proﬁt also reﬂects R&D, which typically applies to many different product
lines in a non-proportional way, and depreciation, which is an accounting number that may have little to do with the
actual economic decay of (or ﬂow of services from) plant and equipment.
At the national level of analysis, corporate gross proﬁt comes closest to capturing the national beneﬁt of a ﬁrm’s headquarters
presence because a large share of the expenditure of gross proﬁts on research, marketing, and administration takes place at or
near corporate headquarters, as does, in the case of most carriers, infrastructure investment. It is harder to generalize about the
locations where operating or net proﬁts are disbursed. The operating and net proﬁts at the ﬁrm level are considered in Section 6.2.
While the gross proﬁt achieved by the smartphone producers is derived from detailed analysis, it is impractical to do so
for each input. As a shortcut, the gross proﬁt for each component is estimated by multiplying the company-wide gross
margin for the supplier by the reported purchase cost of the component. The gross margin data are readily available from
annual reports in the case of public companies. The results are not sensitive to the unobserved differences between the
estimated and actual gross proﬁt of individual components because the results are driven primarily by the observed
wholesale price differences between components. The main point of converting to a gross proﬁt basis is to underscore how
little value remains for the suppliers after their cost of inputs has been subtracted, without any reference to their overhead
costs or their overall level of competitive success.
The analysis is concentrated on suppliers of high-value components because they capture the majority of value from
among all inputs. In cases where the supplier is not identiﬁed in the teardown report, additional research was conducted
to identify possible sources. For many components, handset makers use multiple sources, and a teardown report will
identify only one of these. With the exception of memory chips, this is less likely to affect high-value components, which
are often speciﬁcally engineered for a particular phone manufacturer. Since the prices of components change over time,
the goal is to derive an estimate that reﬂects values within a few months of the phone’s introduction.4
As the breakdown of the proﬁt hierarchy, from gross to net, shows, the analysis requires knowing the wholesale price of
handsets (what the carrier pays to the handset maker), but this is not generally published. This value is estimated by
looking at various sources, such as the prices charged to cellular subscribers, estimates of phone subsidies from carriers,
and statements of average value per phone in company annual reports.4. Inside phones
Using teardown reports (iSuppli, 2007; Portelligent, Inc., 2004, 2005), the key parts in three cell phone models that
trace the evolution from feature phone to smartphone were compared. All three models were initially offered through
exclusive arrangements with a US carrier, marking a tighter coordination of interests between carriers and handset
manufacturers than had existed previously.
Each of the three phones was innovative in some way within its manufacturer’s line-up. Motorola’s V3 RAZR phone was
notable for its slim design which led to it being the most purchased handset model in the US until it was unseated by the
iPhone 3G in late 2008.5 The Palm Treo 650 combined features of a PDA and mobile phone with touchscreen and keyboardhis approach is necessitated by the dates when the analyst estimates are published. Industry experts interviewed in the course of this research
hat component prices tend to fall 5–10% per quarter depending on market characteristics. Phone prices (and carrier subsidies) change less often,
change depends on demand for the phone, the need to clear inventory before introducing a new model, and other product-speciﬁc factors.
cise evolution of value capture over time is therefore difﬁcult to predict but is not likely to differ qualitatively from the presentation in the text
e carrier’s share will generally dominate, with the handset maker close behind).
ccording to NPD data reported in Reardon (2008).
Table 1
Comparison of inputs as percentage of factory cost: three phones.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Motorola V3 ‘‘RAZR’’ Treo 650 CDMA RIM Curve 8300
Year of introduction 2004 2004 2007
Display (%) 30 23 11
Processors (%) 10 16 13
Storage (%) 9 3 9
Memory (%) 2 5
Assembly (%) 4 6 7
Camera (%) 5 3 8
Cellular and bluetooth chips (%) 6 4 4
Cellular license (%) 4 Incl. in chip cost 5
Battery (%) 3 5 4
PCBs (%) 5 5 5
Enclosure (%) 2 2 5
Keypad (%) 6 1 2
Software (%) Not applicable 5 Not applicable
Sub-total for key components (%) 86 82 72
Hundreds of other components (%) 14 18 28
Total (%) 100 100 100
Total parts 640 1040 585
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market with a slim product that featured a full keyboard.
Although the original Motorola RAZR was not a smartphone in the sense of offering PC-like functionality, it had a
Wireless Access Protocol (WAP) browser for viewing some parts of the Internet and also a personal information
management software package. More importantly, however, it helped set the trend of distinctive phones being sold at
subsidized prices in exclusive arrangements with one or two carriers.
Table 1 shows how the three systems compare in terms of their key inputs as a percentage of factory cost (the total of
the inputs). In the Motorola and Palm phones, the most expensive single input – up to a third of the total – is the display
module, which must be compact and high-resolution. Display prices have continued to fall due to both manufacturing
advances and increased competition, and the display for the Curve 8300, which dates from a few years later than the
others, accounts for just 11% of the total factory cost. Microchips, including processors, wireless transceivers, and memory,
are another signiﬁcant expense area, accounting for about a quarter of the factory cost in all three models. Most of the
remaining cost is taken up by the camera module, the license fee for the phone’s cellular protocol, the battery, printed
circuit boards, the keypad, the casing (called an enclosure), and the assembly of components into the ﬁnal product. Each of
these accounts for between 2% and 8% of the factory cost, with details shown in Table 1.
The operating systems for the computing functions were managed under different business models. Motorola’s RAZR
and RIM’s Curve used internally developed software. This software is not counted as a cost since Motorola (or RIM) would
just have paid the software fee to itself. Palm’s operating system was originally developed internally, but the software
business was spun off to shareholders in 2003 and acquired in late 2005 by Access, a Japanese software company that
produced the world’s ﬁrst mobile browser. Based on Palm’s reported payments to its software spin-off, PalmSource, the
licensing fee per unit was about $10.
A more detailed accounting of the key inputs in each phone is given in Tables A1–A3.
As depicted by the differences between the columns in Table 1, smartphone architectures (e.g., touchscreens versus
keyboards) have not yet come together around a dominant design (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman,
1990). This remains true, with leading models such as the iPhone, Droid phones from HTC, Samsung and Motorola, and
Nokia’s N-Series featuring different physical user interfaces, in addition to their different operating systems. Some leading
smartphone brands, including RIM and Nokia, offer both touchscreen and keyboard models.
One consequence of this lack of uniformity is that competition continues to be based more on feature differences than
on price, consistent with the aspect of PFI theory that relates to the relative maturity of an industry (Teece, 1986). This
explains in part the attractive margins (i.e., ratios of proﬁt to sales) that will be seen later and marks a key difference
between the markets for smartphones and for PCs. In the latter, the scope for lead ﬁrms to distinguish their products is
extremely limited, which results in more modest margins (Dedrick et al., 2010).
5. Value capture along the supply chain
Next, the analysis turns to a consideration of proﬁtability along the supply chain. It starts by looking at component
suppliers and the handset maker, with the results for suppliers broken down into regions as follows: US-based, Japan,
Table 2
Estimated gross proﬁt shares of suppliers for four phones.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
US-based
suppliers (%)
Japan-based
suppliers (%)
Other Asia
suppliers (%)
Europe-based
suppliers (%)
Supplier location
unidentiﬁed (%)
Total
(%)
Motorola RAZR 36 28 6 0 30 100
Palm Treo 650 39 19 8 3 31 100
RIM BlackBerry
Curve 8300
41 2 8 12 37 100
Nokia 7710 17 35 2 11 36 100
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carriers is introduced.
5.1. Supplier value capture
Supplier value capture is estimated by applying each supplier’s 2005 gross margin (2007 in the case of the Curve 8300)
to the value of the input it supplied to the phone, as detailed in Appendix tables. Where the supplier is unknown, 33% is
applied. This is the average gross margin for 270 of the leading global electronics ﬁrms for 2004 as reported in Electronic
Business’ EB300 listing.6
Table 2 shows the results of these calculations, aggregated for suppliers by the location of their headquarters. For the
purpose of this section, the table also includes the results from a comparable analysis on a Nokia 7710 (Table A4), a
touchscreen-based phone that wasn’t sold in the United States. Each cell of the table represents the estimate of the gross
proﬁts earned by suppliers in a particular region as a share of all supplier proﬁts, not including the gross proﬁt of the
handset maker.
Attributing the gross proﬁt to the headquarters country is appropriate because overhead spending (R&D, marketing,
and administration) is still largely homebound. Even in the case of the highly globalized semiconductor industry, Macher,
Mowery, and Di Minin (2007) found that roughly 90% of US patents issued to chip ﬁrms from 1991 to 2003 had only
US-based inventors, with little change in the share over the period. The home-country bias of patents was slightly higher
in Japan and slightly lower in Europe, with Korea and Taiwan about the same as the US.
More than a quarter of the aggregate supplier proﬁts in each phone could not be tied to a ﬁrm or a region, with a high of
36% for the Nokia phone.
Of the suppliers identiﬁed, US-based suppliers dominate, primarily due to their strength in integrated circuits. Japanese
suppliers played a key role, especially in the very-thin RAZR design, but Japanese suppliers of displays and batteries have
faced severe competition in recent years from rivals in Korea, Taiwan, and mainland China. For example, Japanese
suppliers once dominated the market for handset displays, a high-value component. But, by 2009, Sharp Corp. ranked just
third among a top ﬁve dominated by Samsung and populated by ﬁrms from Taiwan and Hong Kong.7
The geographical data in Table 2, although incomplete because of the unidentiﬁed components, raise the question of a
possible relationship between handset maker nationality and supplier choice. The role of US-based suppliers ranges from
36% to 41% for the handsets from North American ﬁrms, but is only 17% in the Nokia phone. Europe-based suppliers are
most important (11% and 12% versus 0% and 3%) in the handsets from the European and Canadian companies in the
sample.
If there is a causal relationship between the nationalities of the handset maker and its suppliers, the correlation is
constrained by the fact that suppliers of each type of input are not distributed evenly among the world’s regions. For
example, ﬂat panel displays are produced primarily in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. Chips, however, are important
components for which production is dispersed, giving handset makers a meaningful choice so that a preference might
be detected. For example, a published teardown of a smartphone from Japan’s Sharp Corp. showed that it used a Toshiba
application processor when Toshiba was a relatively minor supplier of these parts, suggesting that transaction costs or
other hard-to-observe forces may be driving supplier choice.8
Such a relationship, if conﬁrmed by further research, might be explainable by any of several processes. These include
cultural afﬁnity and a corresponding increase in trust, efﬁciencies from the regional co-location of the relevant engineering
groups, or path dependence based on historical ties. Field work will most likely be needed to differentiate among the
various possibilities.6 As calculated from EB300: The Rankings, Electronic Business, August 2005. Retrieved from http://www.edn.com/article/CA630171.html?partner=eb
on February 9, 2009. The results are not sensitive to changes in this industry-average gross margin.
7 Data for the fourth quarter of 2009, reported in DisplaySearch (2010).
8 Tearing Down SoftBank’s Handset w/ Touch Sensor, Tech-On, April 22, 2008; application processor market data for 2008 are from Forward
Concepts, reported in Clark (2009).
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In a supply chain analysis of iPods and notebook PCs, Dedrick et al. (2010) were able to use the retail prices to drive the
analysis of how much value is captured by particular ﬁrms and countries. Unfortunately that is far more difﬁcult in the
case of high-end mobile phones because their business model is very different. The estimates that follow are rough, but
should be of the right orders of magnitude. As such, they are still useful for analyzing value capture along the industry
supply chain.
High-end phones such as those analyzed here are generally sold through carriers, who bundle them with service
contracts and subsidize the cost of the phone in anticipation of the carrier’s future subscriber revenues. The actual
wholesale price received by the phone manufacturer is not observed and is treated by seller and buyer as a closely guarded
secret. Moreover, the low prices paid by consumers reﬂect not only subsidies but also ﬁnder’s fees paid by carriers to third
parties, frequent promotional rebates borne by some combination of the carrier and the manufacturer, and the steeply
declining price of rapidly aging technology. In the case of the RAZR, which proved to be very popular, the initial price with
contract in November 2004 was $500. By May 2005 that dropped to $400 through Cingular (now AT&T), the exclusive
network partner, but promotional offers from Amazon and other retailers at the time were as low as $50. In July 2005, the
ofﬁcial price through Cingular and T-Mobile (which was added as a second carrier) dropped to $200.
The price received by the handset maker is the sum of the price paid by the consumer and the subsidy paid by the
carrier. Based on Motorola’s quarterly unit sales ﬁgures during 2005 and the changes in price over the year, a volume-
weighted average consumer price for the RAZR is estimated to be $250. An industry analyst consulted for this study
estimated that the subsidy for this phone was probably $100, for an average price of $350 received by Motorola.9
Subtracting the estimated factory cost of $144 (Table A1) gives an estimate of $206 for Motorola’s gross proﬁt. As a
percentage of the sales price, that’s a gross margin of 82%, much higher than Motorola’s overall gross margin of 32% in
calendar year 2005, but it is likely that the hit RAZR phone was at the high end of Motorola’s relatively wide range of
business lines and the broad range of handsets that it sells.
Sales information about the Treo 650 is harder to Kim et al. (2004) at $450 with a two-year contract and lowered it to
$350 over the next 18 months before the next-generation Treo was introduced. Palm’s self-reported average handset price
in the ﬁscal year ended in May 2006 was $316, up from $265 the year before. Based on the limited evidence, the wholesale
price received by Palm for the Treo 650 was set at $425, including a carrier subsidy of $100. Subtracting the $197 estimated
factory cost (Table A2) leaves Palm a gross proﬁt of $228, or a gross margin of 54% (compared with Palm’s overall gross
margin of 33% for FYE May 2006). This disparity seems reasonable because the Treo 650 would be at the high end of Palm’s
offerings, which included non-phone handheld computers.
The Curve 8300 was launched in the US in mid-2007 by Cingular/AT&T at a no-contract price of $450, or a $200 price
with a 2-year contract (and a subsidy of undisclosed size paid by the carrier to RIM). In the year ended March 1, 2008, 59%
of RIM’s revenues came from the United States, with 8% from the United Kingdom and 7% from Canada, so the United
States price is the most relevant.
Based on previous research on small, portable electronics (Dedrick et al., 2010), a reasonable wholesale discount for
distribution and retail is 25%. Against the $450 unlocked price, that equates to a wholesale price to RIM of $337.50. RIM’s
self-reported average selling price for the year ending March 1, 2008 was $346, which will be used as the wholesale price
for the present analysis.
RIM’s per-unit gross proﬁt is the difference between the $346 wholesale price and the $108 estimated factory cost
(Table A3), or $238. That equals a gross margin of 69%, larger than RIM’s overall hardware gross margin for FYE March 2008
of 44%.10
The disparity in proﬁts among the three handsets seems to reﬂect ﬁrm positioning, although the margins of error on
these estimates render such analysis tentative. Motorola’s 82% can be attributed to the popularity of the sleek RAZR design
in the period right after its introduction. As detailed above, Motorola rapidly lowered its price to expand market share,
sacriﬁcing some of its gross margin in favor of higher volume. Palm, a mobile computing ﬁrm with limited traction in the
phone market, has the lowest gross margin (54%). Research in Motion also came from a mobile computing background, but
enjoyed some customer lock-in, and hence greater appropriability of value, thanks to the adoption of its pioneering push
e-mail system by many corporate users. RIM was able to command 69% even on a unit targeting consumers.
Table 3 shows these handset maker gross proﬁts in dollar terms and compares them with the total gross proﬁts of all
suppliers. In all three cases, the gross proﬁt of the handset maker is far more than the combined estimated gross proﬁts of
all the suppliers.
These results matter not just for proﬁts, but also for high-value jobs such as administration and research that the proﬁts
support. For example, Cohen, Di Minin, Motoyama, and Palmberg (2009) found that all the inventors listed on the majority9 See also Carson (2006).
10 RIM also earns money from fees for the network services that it provides to carriers and their subscribers via RIM’s Network Operations Center, on
the order of $5 per user per month, as calculated from their Annual Reports. This would add $120 in revenue over the life of a 2-year contract. Applying
RIM’s FYE 3/08 gross margin for software and services, 84%, yields an additional gross proﬁt of $101 over the 2-year life of a contract, which yields a total
gross proﬁt per phone of $329. However this higher ﬁgure will not be used in the body of this article in order to keep all gross proﬁt conceptually related
to the wholesale price.
Table 3
Estimated proﬁtability of suppliers for three phones.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Handset maker
gross proﬁt
Lead ﬁrm
HQ location
Total gross proﬁts
for all suppliers
Largest region
of input supply
Motorola RAZR $206.00 US $46.51 US
Palm Treo 650 $228.00 US $75.90 US
RIM Curve 8300 $238.00a Canada $34.77 US
a Does not include additional gross proﬁt from Network Operations Center services.
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The explanations they advance are a combination of organizational inertia and the slow maturation of offshore R&D
centers. A study of the global iPod supply chain (Linden et al., in press) estimated that twice as many jobs in 2006
(including distribution, retail, and a share of Apple overhead as well as the supply chain) were located outside the US as in
it, but the US-based workers earned twice as much in total wages. Based on the information available about the iPhone’s
supply chain, the distribution of jobs and wages is probably similar, and this relationship holds for other smartphones as
well. The evidence strongly suggests that the headquarters presence of successful ﬁrms remains vital to national outcomes
(e.g., jobs for high-skilled labor).5.3. Carrier value capture
Another element of the smartphone supply chain analyzed in this article is distribution and usage. The landscape for
handset distribution is very complex. The smartphone companies sell directly in some cases, ship via distribution partners
in others, and ship directly to carrier warehouses in others. Smartphones in the US are typically sold through a close
arrangement between phone maker and carrier, so direct shipment (i.e., no distributor apart from a logistics company) is a
common route, with a third-party freight or logistics ﬁrm generally handling the physical movement of goods.
Here, attention will be restricted to this distributor-free, carrier-direct case in order to extend the supply chain
discussion to include the carrier’s value capture. As mentioned above, the RAZR was initially sold exclusively through
Cingular, with T-Mobile added after about 6 months. The Curve 8300 was also launched in the US as a Cingular/AT&T
exclusive.11 The Treo 650 for CDMA was initially sold exclusively through Sprint PCS, with Verizon added after about
6 months.
The estimate of the carrier’s per-phone proﬁt presented here uses Cingular and the RAZR. On average, Cingular, like
other carriers, incurs a loss on handset sales. In Cingular’s ﬁnancial reports for the period, its reported cost of equipment
(primarily phones) exceeded equipment revenues by 25% across all the handset models that they were offering.12
Carrier proﬁts come from subscriber fees, reported by the companies as average revenue per user (ARPU), from which
the $100 RAZR subsidy discussed in the previous section is subtracted. Subsidized smartphones are frequently sold with a
two-year contract, so this time period was used as the basis for calculations. The second year was discounted by 5% to
estimate its net present value.
For Cingular/AT&T in 2005/2006, total ARPU, adjusted to reﬂect the net present value of the second year, was $1155.
The company’s gross margin for services (the difference between services revenue and the cost of services, excluding
depreciation, divided by revenue) during that time was about 70%. Multiplying these numbers yields an estimate of $804
gross proﬁt per user. Subtracting the $100 subsidy leaves an estimated gross proﬁt per phone of $704 for Cingular. The
same calculations for Sprint and the Treo 650 produced a carrier gross proﬁt per user of $975. These estimates, which are
more than twice the per-phone proﬁt estimates reported for Motorola and Palm in Table 3, make clear why the carriers are
willing to subsidize handsets.13
Fig. 1 combines all the data described so far for Motorola’s original V3 RAZR phone to show the breakdown of the value
capture estimates. The dominant proﬁt position of the carrier, with three quarters of the total gross proﬁt from the phone,
is evident, followed by that of Motorola, with about one ﬁfth. Supplier value capture is shown by region, with the US share
just slightly larger than that of Japan. Of the slice of value capture labeled Location Unidentiﬁed, at least some of it would
also belong to ﬁrms based in the US or Japan. The value captured by the carrier would normally be applied to its home
country, although there is foreign ownership in some US carriers (e.g., Vodafone owns 45% of Verizon Wireless).11 Cingular was rebranded as AT&T in 2007, the year of the Curve 8300 introduction.
12 Applying this average handset subsidyrate (which is distorted by the inclusion of unsubsidized handset sales) to the V3 RAZR wholesale price
calculated above leads to an estimated handset subsidy of $87 versus the $100 used in the analysis.
13 The dominance of the carrier does not rest on the two-year contract length. According to one source (Ahonen, 2010, p. 94), the average
replacement cycle for mobile phones worldwide is 17 months. Even if only a 12-month period before the consumer replaces her handset were modeled,
the results for Cingular and Sprint, which would be $315 and $451, respectively, would still be greater than the proﬁts estimated for the corresponding
handset makers ($206 and $228).
Fig. 1. Gross proﬁt in the Motorola V3 RAZR supply chain.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Fig. 2. Operating proﬁt in the Motorola V3 RAZR supply chain.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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reﬂect the companies’ operating proﬁts. This was done by applying values for company-wide operating margin in each
step of the estimation procedure where before gross margin was used. The most notable feature about the ﬁgure is that it
reverses the ranking of Motorola and the carrier because the latter carries the ﬁnancial burden of installing and
maintaining a nationwide network infrastructure. The contrast of gross and operating margins would be somewhat less
drastic had it been made it using Palm and Sprint because Sprint’s operating margin was healthier than Cingular’s at the
time (see Table 4).
6. Cooperation and competition along the supply chain
The analysis so far has shown that carriers capture the most value (measured as gross proﬁts) in the smartphone supply
chain, followed by handset makers, with component suppliers a distant third. Next, the article discusses the economics of
handset subsidies and market power in the supply chain in light of the value analysis. Then it returns to the supply chain
to consider a broader selection of proﬁt measures for selected ﬁrms.
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The subsidization of handsets within a bundle that includes handset and service contract remains a strong force in
some countries, particularly the United States. According to one analyst, the average handset discount offered by carriers
in the US has climbed from 60% of retail price in 2006 to 80% in 2008 (FCC, 2010, p. 169). US carriers have ﬂirted with
offering no-contract plans, but they have not pursued the strategy with any vigor. Verizon introduced a no-contract option,
but offered only the same monthly pricing as for customers agreeing to a subsidized phone and a contract. In 2009,
T-Mobile launched its Even More Plus plans, which offered no-contract service at a discount, but it removed the offer from
its website after a year.14
Bundles make it difﬁcult for consumers to know how much they are paying for the phone, which is often presented as
free. The high monthly service fees may continue long after the carrier has recovered the full retail price of the handset.
With respect to the debate on bundling of handsets and service contracts, the value analysis can be used to think about
how these numbers might differ had subsidies been forbidden at the time the phone was released. In a study of the Korean
market, the elimination of subsidies in 2000 led to a drop in service charges of about 15% at the two biggest carriers
(Kim et al., 2004, p. 35). In the RAZR example, the end of the $100 handset subsidy could support a reduction in service
charges by the carrier of about 10% and still leave the carrier with the same gross proﬁt. And subsidies have gotten steeper
since then as smartphones allow carriers to add data subscriptions to their voice contracts. Estimates of the subsidy on the
3G iPhone ranged as high as $500 (Wingﬁeld, 2008). This leaves much greater scope for carrier service charge reductions if
subsidies were banned, calling into question the argument that phone subsidies are pro-consumer (Hazlett, 2010, p. 9).
Removal of handset subsidies (with the hidden installment plan that they entail) and the end of bundling would allow
consumers to make a more direct comparison of prices between carriers, as well as making it possible for consumers to
pay for only as much phone as they need. Under the current system, all phone users are helping to repay the subsidies on
high-end phones.
The picture is different for the handset maker. If the full unsubsidized price ($350 in the case of the RAZR) had been
charged on all units sold, the per-unit proﬁt would be the same as calculated above. However it is likely that fewer units
would be sold at the unsubsidized price because consumers would shift to lower-priced phones, so that Motorola’s total
gross proﬁt from RAZR sales would have been lower. There is also a negative dynamic effect, because lower sales volume
makes it harder for the handset maker to cover its ﬁxed development costs and to extract price reductions from its
suppliers over time. In short, the absence of subsidies would have meant lower total proﬁts for all the ﬁrms along the
supply chain: carriers, handset makers and component suppliers.
The end of subsidies could also negatively affect an innovative handset maker’s ability to enter the market by slowing
adoption, which lengthens the time before the device can reach critical mass in the market. Smartphones that run
independently developed software applications, like those from the iPhone’s App Store, beneﬁt from network effects; the
more people that are using smartphones that run on a given platform, the greater the incentive for independent software
vendors to write applications for that platform. If the end of subsidies leads to the slower uptake of a new smartphone
platform, then it’s harder for a novel platform such as the iPhone to reach a self-sustaining critical mass of users. This type
of reasoning was behind one study’s endorsement of the Finnish government’s permission for otherwise-forbidden
subsidies to be used in the years following the introduction of 3G handsets (Tallberg et al., 2007).
The use of subsidies for enabling market entry may, however, have an anti-competitive consequence. Circumstantial
evidence suggests that the adoption of one handset over another by a carrier determines market outcomes. In the US,
where Nokia’s N97 received no carrier subsidy, Apple’s (subsidized) iPhone dominates, but in the UK, where the N97 was
subsidized more heavily than the iPhone, the N97 outsold the iPhone 3GS (Ahonen, 2010, p. 116).
This state of affairs would be normal market behavior, except that the market for telecom operators is quite
concentrated. The US Department of Justice merger guidelines consider a market highly concentrated if the post-merger
Hirschmann-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) exceeds 1800. The United States was at an overall HHI of 2220 in 2008, while
continental Europe and Japan were around 3000 or more (FCC, 2010, p. 197). The practical implication is that there are far
fewer carriers than handset ﬁrms, which puts dominant carriers in the role of kingmaker. So, for example, when Palm tried
to revive its business in 2009 with a completely new phone platform (WebOS), it struck a subsidy deal with Sprint (as it
had for the Treo phone analyzed above). However Sprint runs a distant third in the US market. Small wonder that the Palm
Pre underperformed and the company had to be sold off to Hewlett-Packard the following year.
Concentration in the US market has been increasing. According to the FCC (2010, p. 42), the population-weighted HHI
increased from a weighted average of 2151 in 2003 to 2848 in 2008. Although prices per minute of voice use are not
especially high by international standards, these do not reﬂect the addition of data usage, which has been growing rapidly
in the wake of smartphone adoption. As a percentage of industry revenue, data amounted to about 14% of the total in 2008
(FCC, 2010, p. 116). For Verizon and AT&T, the percentage was even higher, at about 25% each (FCC, 2010, p. 118). In terms
of average revenue per user, the United States, at a national average of $51.54 in 2008, was one of the highest in the world
(FCC, 2010, p. 195). This was slightly less than Japan (at $56.82), but considerably more than the UK ($35.35), Germany14 The preference by carriers for bundling has also been noted in other cases where carriers were allowed to offer either bundled or unbundled
options (Tallberg et al., 2007, p. 653).
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reﬂects the growing role of data services as a cash cow.6.2. Market power in the supply chain
Handset makers and carriers each try to increase their market power so as to command a greater share of the value they
create. Carrier dominance of the gross proﬁt pie does not appear to have eroded since the early smartphones analyzed
above. The most signiﬁcant development in the industry in recent years is the launch of Apple’s iPhone series. The authors
made comparable calculations for Apple’s ﬁrst-generation iPhone in late 2007 and early 2008 assuming a $200 subsidy.
The estimate of Apple’s gross proﬁt per phone was $284, and the corresponding estimate of AT&T’s proﬁt per iPhone user
was $1248.15
In the smartphone market, carriers and handset makers each try to gain advantage relative to rivals and to increase their
leverage with suppliers and customers. Handset makers can accomplish this in part by building brand image with
consumers. An excellent recent example of this is Apple’s iPhone. Well regarded by consumers based on its hit line of iPod
music players, Apple rapidly gained market share and was reportedly able to negotiate a share of monthly iPhone subscriber
revenue from AT&T (Sharma, Wingﬁeld, & Yuan, 2007). In an evolving market with no dominant design, Apple was able to
beneﬁt from its early introduction of innovations such as touchscreens and its integration of hardware and software.
Another strategy has been to create complementary assets that make smartphones more valuable. RIM introduced a
push e-mail service for the Blackberry which became highly popular with business users. Apple enabled a valuable supply
of applications which it offers through its App Store, a strategy soon imitated by Google, HP/Palm, and RIM. By nurturing
the creation of complementary assets linked to a particular platform, phone makers may increase their ability to
appropriate proﬁts by creating switching costs for users, who would have to abandon or repurchase some applications by
switching.
Appropriability for carriers is protected by a more tangible switching cost in the form of locked phones, long-term
service contracts, and early termination fees. Smartphones are important complementary assets, and carriers compete
with each other in part by featuring the most enticing handsets.
In terms of bargaining power within the supply chain, carriers have worked to build their own brands while
diminishing the prominence of the handset makers. This movement is most pronounced in Europe, where a lesser reliance
on carrier subsidies (and the associated lock-in) meant that phone buyers were used to shopping for carriers. European
carriers like Vodafone and Orange turned to small phone makers or independent design houses to build custom phones
using software that helped keep customers visiting carrier websites for added-value services such as ringtones (Pringle,
2001, 2002). Beyond this, carriers have been increasingly successful at negotiating customization deals that placed their
names on the phones they sold, even from large, well-known companies like Nokia (Faucon, 2003; Pringle, 2004). Carrier
branding occurs in the US as well, and Palm’s Treo 650 was branded with Sprint’s logo. On the other hand, phone makers
such as Apple and RIM have built strong brands themselves and have been able to negotiate with carriers for a share of
service revenues (in RIM’s case, charging for its e-mail service).
But this struggle over value must be viewed in perspective by stepping back to consider a broader view of the
proﬁtability of these companies, as depicted by the major difference between Figs. 1 and 2. Here, four measures are
presented: gross margin (GM), operating margin (OM), Net Margin (NM), and return on assets (ROA). The margins are the
same as the proﬁt concepts introduced in Section 3, but expressed as a ratio to sales. GM, gross proﬁt over net sales, shows
what share of a ﬁrm’s sales price is retained after the direct costs of producing its goods or services are deducted. OM,
operating proﬁt over net sales, shows the success of a ﬁrm’s overall productive and innovative activity. NM, the ratio of net
proﬁt (or loss) to sales, is included for reference; it is often misleading because of large one-time charges or receipts. ROA,
the ratio of net proﬁt (or loss) to Total Assets (an accounting value reported on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet), shows the ﬁrm’s
economic efﬁciency in the use of capital from its shareholders and creditors.
Table 4 shows these data for four handset makers, Motorola, Nokia, Palm, and RIM; and for three carriers, Cingular,
Sprint Nextel’s wireless division, and Verizon’s Wireless segment. The handset maker margins are company-wide values
and can at best give a suggestion of how the companies compare at the level of the individual products that were analyzed
in the rest of this article. Company-wide values are driven by factors such as the strength or weakness of a company’s
brand, whether its sales were in line with its forecast, and the general economic climate.
The company-wide carrier gross margins are signiﬁcantly higher than the GMs for three of the handset makers,
reinforcing the impression of Fig. 1. RIM’s margins are high for a handset ﬁrm in part because the company is differentiated
from others by its strong enterprise-focused business model, discussed above.
The handset ﬁrms and carriers are more similar in terms of OM, i.e., after overhead costs such as marketing, R&D, and
depreciation (an accounting number that may differ greatly from the true economic deterioration of infrastructure) have
been subtracted out of income. Net margin (and hence ROA) can be misleading, as demonstrated by the data for Palm,
which reﬂect a large one-time tax beneﬁt.15 The AT&T estimate reﬂects the fact, disclosed by AT&T, that iPhone user ARPU is 1.6 that of other AT&T Wireless subscribers (Sharma & Cheng,
2008).
Table 4
Selected ﬁnancial ratios for the ﬁscal year covering December 2005.
Source: Authors’ calculations from company reports; Sprint data are for Sprint Nextel’s Wireless segment only. Verizon data are for Verizon Wireless,
which did not report total assets or ROA for its wireless segment in 2005.
Gross margin (%) Operating margin (%) Net margin (%) Return on assets (%)
Baseband suppliers
Freescale 42 10 10 8
Qualcomm 71 36 33 16
Handset makers
Motorola 32 13 12 13
Nokia 35 14 10 16
Palm 33 7 21a 23a
RIM 55 20 19 17
Carriers
Cingular 58 5 1 1
Sprint 61 10 5 3
Verizon 71 23 7 N/A
a Palm’s NM and ROA reﬂect a large one-time tax beneﬁt, without which ROA would have been close to its operating margin of 7%.
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reﬂects the difference between the huge capital investments by the carriers to build and upgrade their cellular networks
and the asset-light business models of these handset makers, who outsource much of their manufacturing.
The more complete picture of proﬁtability in Table 4 suggests that there is a limit to howmuch handset makers will be able to
raise their margins by negotiating a transfer from their carrier partners. The carriers already have relatively low returns on assets
and cannot afford to give up much more proﬁt to the handset makers. In fact, European carriers have begun lobbying for
companies that induce heavy use of the network, particularly Apple and Google, to share the cost of the network, and they appear
to be getting a sympathetic hearing from governments in France and the United Kingdom (Campbell & Browning, 2011).
Although component suppliers generally have little market power in the mobile telecommunications supply chain,
there are important exceptions. Table 4 also includes data for two suppliers of the baseband chip that controls the digital
side of a phone’s cellular functions (before and after analog chips have converted the signal for transmission and
receiving). Freescale Semiconductor, the spin-off of Motorola’s chip division, is one of many ﬁrms that supply baseband
chips for GSM and related standards. In 2005, it ranked second behind the leader, Texas Instruments (Lammers, 2006). The
ﬁerce competition in the GSM side of the baseband market has led it to consider the once unthinkable step of selling off its
wireless chip business (Ojo, 2008).
This is a sharp contrast with Qualcomm, the supplier of the Treo 650’s CDMA baseband and related chips, as well as the
principal licensor for the use of CDMA technology. Qualcomm pioneered the CDMA standard and has remained the near-
monopoly supplier of the chips, in addition to receiving a royalty for every 3G (CDMA2000, W-CDMA, and TD-SCDMA)
phone. Qualcomm’s large margins demonstrate the beneﬁts of owning a successful standard.6.3. Policy implications
Two policy issues raised in the introduction can be informed by the preceding analysis. The ﬁrst is whether policies that
support domestic handset manufacturers are worthwhile if the producers rely on foreign suppliers of components and
manufacturing services. This research has conﬁrmed the results of previous studies that the greatest returns in global
value chains accrue to the brand-name ﬁrms (in this case, the handset makers) that orchestrate them. Thus there is some
justiﬁcation for supporting domestic handset makers because the ﬁnancial beneﬁt to countries is largely a function of the
success of the ﬁrms located there; home countries capture value in the form of high wage jobs (e.g., R&D, management,
and marketing), and returns to shareholders. National governments can support domestic ﬁrms, consistent with WTO
agreements, by creating a domestic environment where new standards can be developed and deployed, stimulating
competition among domestic companies to encourage innovation, and using diplomacy to make sure that domestic
standards and companies have an opportunity to compete fairly in international markets.
The second policy issue is whether the use of carrier subsidies for phones in exchange for ﬁxed-term contracts is
socially beneﬁcial. The analysis showed that subsidized bundling is a double-edged sword. In the absence of subsidies,
fewer units of smartphones would have been sold. It would therefore have been harder for handset makers to cover ﬁxed
development costs and reach a critical mass of users for their platform. This would have made it harder for an innovative
handset like the iPhone to establish itself among established global competitors.
But the analysis has also pointed out the potential anti-competitive effects ﬂowing from the fact that telecom markets
in most advanced economies are concentrated among a handful of operators. Because of this, subsidy deals favor some
handset makers over others, so that they may actually prevent entry by innovators. Long-term exclusive agreements
involving successful handsets, such as that between Apple and AT&T (which lasted more than three years), may even have
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other carriers (FCC, 2010, p. 81).
Possible remedies that balance the costs and beneﬁts include a limit (perhaps one year) on the duration of the period of
exclusivity between a carrier and a handset maker. An alternative is to limit bundling to the two years following the
introduction of a new technology (e.g., LTE) by a carrier. This would be similar to the policy adopted in Finland in 2006 to
facilitate the roll-out of 3G (Tallberg et al., 2007).
7. Summary and conclusions
This article has presented the ﬁrst quantitative analysis of value capture by ﬁrms along the supply chain for high-end
phones. Extension of this methodology to more pieces of the telecommunications value network is an area for future research.
This study has several limitations. In particular, the analysis is forced to rely on rough estimates for certain variables
because the actual costs and prices are not public and therefore not known with any precision. Another limitation is that
the analysis has not attempted to estimate the value received by handset makers from third-party ‘‘apps’’ (software
programs that run on the phone), which are rapidly growing in importance as an element of the value network.
Within these limitations, the study analyzed the handset value chain from components to consumer. It showed that a
brand-name handset maker stands to capture greater ﬁnancial value from each phone than any of its suppliers. This is
similar to the case of the iPod, but somewhat different from notebook PCs, where Intel and Microsoft capture a signiﬁcant
share of the ﬁnancial value (Dedrick et al., 2010).
The smartphone supply chain also includes carriers, which have no equivalent in the supply chains of non-subscription
devices such as iPods or PCs. The carriers capture a great deal of value (at least in terms of gross proﬁt) from each handset.
However the carriers must also shoulder the burden of network installation, maintenance, and upgrades, which absorbs a
lot of the gross value from their subscription fees. Even so, the value of their operating proﬁts per phone dwarfs those of
any upstream suppliers of handset inputs (see Fig. 2).
The value capture methodology also allows quantiﬁcation and analysis of some of the microeconomic aspects of
handset subsidies. The quantitative results conﬁrm the qualitative analysis in Tallberg et al. (2007) that argued in favor of
subsidies during the introduction of new technologies in order to accelerate adoption, with proper regard for the potential
anti-competitive effects of customer lock-in through long-term contract commitments. The estimates show how much
higher service charges might be because of subsidies and the resulting customer commitments. Yet, it is recognized that
the beneﬁts of lower consumer prices due to subsidies beneﬁt the entire supply chain by increasing sales volumes.
In the ongoing struggle for value capture in the smartphone supply chain, the business models and managerial
attention of component and system suppliers continue to evolve. With no dominant design, ﬁrms are free to experiment
with new product designs and business models. Companies at all levels of the supply chain compete with rivals for market
share and proﬁts and negotiate with their suppliers and customers to appropriate more of the proﬁts from innovation.
Brand building and management of customer relationships are critical to capturing value and growing the market as the
end users of networks compare the complete bundle of features and services offered by an array of competing yet
overlapping supply chains. Value-adding complementary goods and services such as downloadable third-party applica-
tions have successfully increased the value of smartphone ownership for handset makers, carriers, and consumers. They
also are shifting the key level of competition toward platforms based on operating systems, including those provided by
software makers such as Google and Microsoft or by the handset makers such as Apple.
In terms of national outcomes, this study shows that handset maker nationality matters most. Whereas most carriers
compete and invest only in their headquarters market, the leading handset makers compete, invest, and source globally.
High-value tasks such as planning and R&D still tend to cluster near the headquarters of companies, so national identity
matters for jobs and income as well as for proﬁt. The same is true for successful component suppliers, as demonstrated in
the examples above by companies like Qualcomm and Texas Instruments. And, as depicted by Table 2, the choice of some
key suppliers may be inﬂuenced by the nationality of the handset ﬁrm, although a broader sample needs to be studied.
Finally, the analysis also shows that, despite the very different business model followed in the phone industry
compared to personal computers and the iPod, supply chain analysis, with suitable adjustments for the relevant business
model, can be useful for revealing which participants capture the most value.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A
See Tables A1–A4.
Table A1
Key inputs in the Motorola V3 RAZR phone.
Source: Portelligent, Inc. (2004) and authors’ calculations.
Type Component Supplier Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of
factory cost
Gross proﬁt
rate (%)
Estd. value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Display
module
Display module Unknowna Japan?b $42.74 29.7 28.6 $12.22
Processors Baseband processor Freescale US $10.05 7.0 42.2 $4.24 10.3
Processors Analog ASIC Texas
Instruments
US $3.92 2.7 48.8 $1.91 20.7
Storage NOR Flash-32M
bytes
Intel US $12.21 8.5 33.0 $7.25
Memory p-SRAM-8M bytes Micron US $3.28 2.3 23.5 $0.77 4.4
Camera Camera module Altus
(Micron)
Taiwan(US) $6.84 4.8 23.5 $1.61 4.4
PCB Main board Unknown $2.67 1.9 33.0 $0.88
Cellular GSM transceiver Freescale US $2.14 1.5 42.2 $0.90 10.3
Cellular Power ampliﬁer/Tx&
Rx switch
Skyworks US $3.58 2.5 38.8 $1.39 6.3
Bluetooth Bluetooth
transceiver
Broadcom US $3.18 2.2 52.5 $1.67 10.9
Battery Li-Ion cell Sanyo Japan $4.18 2.9 17.6 $0.74 o0
Keypad Substrate Unknown Taiwan? $2.56 1.8 33.0 $0.84
Keypad Keypad surface Unknown Korea? $4.15 2.9 33.0 $1.37
Keypad Keypad enclosure Unknown Taiwan? $2.36 1.6 33.0 $0.78
License GSM Various Various $5.00 3.5 33.0 $1.65
Sub-total $108.86 75.7
Other parts $29.06 20.2 33 $9.59
Estimated assembly and test $5.81 4.0 33 $1.92
Estimated factory cost $143.73 100.0 $46.51
Notes: Blank Operating Margin means the actual company was not known (gross margin is industry average), except in the case of Intel’s ﬂash memory
chips, which are not likely to have been as proﬁtable as its processors; industry-average gross margin was used there as well.
Question marks after a Company HQ Location indicates an educated guess based on the structure of the supply market and other sources of information.
a The module supplier’s cost of goods includes $14 for a chip from ATI, which was then a Canadian company (now part of AMD).
b Portelligent considered Japan the likely source for the display module and provided the 28.6% gross margin estimate.
Table A2
Key inputs in the PalmOne Treo 650 phone.
Source: Portelligent, Inc. (2005) and authors’ calculations.
Type Component Supplier Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of
factory cost
Gross proﬁt
rate (%)
Estd. value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Display
module
Display Sony Japan $46.05 23.4 31.1 $14.32 2.6
Processors Mobile station
modem
Qualcommn US $14.30 7.3 60.0 $8.58 30.0
Processors Analog baseband Qualcommn US $2.62 1.3 60.0 $1.57 30.0
Processors 312MHz Application
processor
Intel US $14.22 7.2 59.4 $8.45 31.1
Storage NAND Flash-32M
bytes
M-Systems Israel $4.93 2.5 24.8 $1.22 10.3
Memory SRAM-1M byte Cypress
Semi
US $2.81 1.4 40.4 $1.14 10.4
Memory SDRAM -32M bytes Inﬁneon
Tech
Germany $3.89 2.0 30.2 $1.17 8.1
Memory NOR Flash-4M bytes Intel US $2.78 1.4 33.0 $0.92
Camera Image sensor Micron US $6.05 3.1 23.5 $1.42 4.4
PCB Main board Unknown Taiwan $6.84 3.5 33.0 $2.26
Cellular RF-to-Baseband
receiver
Qualcomma US $2.77 1.4 60.0 $1.66 30.0
Cellular Baseband to RF
transmitter
Qualcomma US $2.27 1.2 60.0 $1.36 30.0
Bluetooth Bluetooth
transceiver
Broadcom US $3.53 1.8 52.5 $1.85 10.9
Battery Battery Unknown $9.28 4.7 33.0 $3.06
Keypad LED (14) Unknown $2.80 1.4 33.0 $0.92
License CDMA Qualcommn US Included in chip
cost
– – –
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Table A2 (continued )
Type Component Supplier Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of
factory cost
Gross proﬁt
rate (%)
Estd. value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Sub-total $125.14 63.7
Other parts $59.85 30.4 33 $19.75
Estimated assembly and test $11.58 5.9 33 $3.82
Estimated factory cost $196.57 100.0 $75.90
Note: Blank Operating Margin means the actual company was not known (gross margin is industry average).
Industry-average gross margin was also used for Intel’s ﬂash memory chips, which are not likely to have been as proﬁtable as its processors.
a Qualcomm margins are estimates based on Qualcomm’s segment reporting of earnings before tax.
Table A3
Key inputs in the RIM Curve 8300.
Source: iSuppli (2007) and authors’ calculations.
Component Most likely
supplier
Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of total
factory cost
Gross
margin
(%)
Est’d value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Display Display module Unknown Asia $11.68 11 16 $1.87 0
Processors Baseband chip Marvell US $14.60 13 48 $7.01 4
Processors Audio processor Texas
Instruments
US $1.88 2 53 $1.00 25
Storage and
memory
Flash and SDRAM
multi-chip package
Intel US $9.25 9 52 $4.81 24
Camera Camera module STMicro Europe $8.50 8 35 $2.98 5
PCB Main PCB AT&S Europe $5.17 5 18 $0.93 9
Cellular RF transceiver Freescale US $2.35 2 33 $0.78 o0
Cellular Power ampliﬁer Freescale US $1.75 2 33 $0.58 o0
Bluetooth Bluetooth chip CSR Europe $1.90 2 47 $0.89 18
Battery Battery pack Unknown Japan (cell) $4.24 4 16 $0.68 1
Keypad Keypad assembly Unknown $1.71 2 33 $0.56
Trackball Trackball mechanism Unknown $0.42 0 33 $0.14
License EDGE royalties Various Various $5.00 5 33 $1.65
Sub-total $68.45 63
Other parts $31.85 29 33 $10.51
Estimated assembly and test $7.95 7 5.0 $0.40 0
Estimated factory cost $108.25 100 $34.77
Note: Blank Operating Margin means the actual company was not known (gross margin is industry average).
Table A4
Key inputs in the Nokia 7710 phone.
Source: Portelligent, Inc. (2005) and authors’ calculations.
Type Component Supplier Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of
factory cost
Gross proﬁt
rate (%)
Estd. value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Display Display module Sanyo? Japan $56.67 29.8 17.6 $9.97 o0
Processors Baseband Nokia/TI US $7.71 4.1 48.8 $3.76 20.7
Processors Application
processor
Texas
Instruments
US $9.64 5.1 48.8 $4.70 20.7
Processors Analog ASIC Nokia/ST
Micro
Europe $3.38 1.8 34.2 $1.16 27.5
Storage SD card Unknowna Unknown $12.00 6.3 42.2 $5.06 25.0
Memory 512M NAND Flash
EEPROM
Toshiba Japan $7.82 4.1 26.5 $2.07 3.8
Memory 64MB SDRAM
memory
Samsung Korea $3.21 1.7 30.1 $0.97 14.0
Memory 4 MB NOR ﬂash Spansion US $1.22 0.6 9.6 $0.12 o0
Camera Camera module Toshiba Japan $11.08 5.8 26.5 $2.94 3.8
PCB Main substrate Ibiden Japan $7.84 4.1 26.1 $2.05 13.7
Cellular GSM transceiver Nokia/ST
Micro
Europe $2.92 1.5 34.2 $1.00 27.5
Cellular Power ampliﬁer RFMD US $1.65 0.9 34.2 $0.56 7.8
J. Dedrick et al. / Telecommunications Policy 35 (2011) 505–521 519
Table A4 (continued )
Type Component Supplier Company HQ
location
Estimated
factory price
Price as % of
factory cost
Gross proﬁt
rate (%)
Estd. value
capture
Operating
margin (%)
Cellular Tx/Rx switch Murata Japan $0.63 0.3 39.7 $0.25 18.3
Bluetooth Bluetooth
transceiver
CSR Europe $2.79 1.5 46.9 $1.31 23.0
Battery Li-ion cell Sony Japan $5.77 3.0 31.1 $1.79 2.6
Battery Battery electronics Mitsumin Japan $0.42 0.2 7.9 $0.03 1.9
License GSM/EDGE Various Various $5.00 2.6 33 $1.65
Sub-total $139.75 73.57
Other parts $42.59 22.42 33 $14.05
Estimated assembly and test $7.61 4.01 33 $2.51
Estimated factory cost $189.95 100.0 $55.96
Note: Blank Operating Margin means the actual company was not known (gross margin is industry average).
a Used 2005 data for SanDisk, the SD card market leader at the time, but the SD card included with the 7110 could also have been made by Toshiba or
another non-US ﬁrm.
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